$\overset{\circ}{\frown}$

Ħ

Joint statement on the dangers of the EU's proposed regulation for fighting child sexual abuse online.

By GEC admin < https://www.globalencryption.org/author/gec-<u>admin/></u>

<u>May 12, 2022 < https://www.globalencryption.org/2022/05/joint-</u> statement-on-the-dangers-of-the-eus-proposed-regulation-forfighting-child-sexual-abuse-online/>

The undersigned organizations, companies, and cybersecurity experts issued the following statement in response to the **Regulation on Child Sexual Abuse (CSA) <** https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/proposal-regulationlaying-down-rules-prevent-and-combat-child-sexual**abuse_en**> that the European Commission proposed on 11 May 2022:

Child sexual abuse is a serious crime that must be addressed by Member states and by other countries around the world. We are concerned, though, that the approach taken by the Commission in this proposed

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue to use this site we will assume that you are okay with that.

The Commission's legislation would enable Member States to compel online platforms, including those offering end-to-end encrypted messaging, to scan users' content and metadata for CSA images and for "grooming" conversations and behavior, and where appropriate, report them to public authorities and delete them from their platforms. Such a requirement is fundamentally incompatible with end-to-end encrypted messaging because platforms that offer such service cannot access communications content. This has been confirmed by experts around the world who produced an *analysis* <

https://www.globalencryption.org/wp-content/uploads /2020/11/2020-Breaking-Encryption-Myths.pdf> of how any form of scanning breaks end-to-end encrypted systems in addition to a detailed <u>report < https://fletcher.tufts.edu/news-events</u> /news/bugs-our-pockets-risks-client-side-scanning> on the multiple ways in which client-side scanning, in particular, "can fail, can be evaded, and can be abused."

Instead of mandating measures that are inconsistent with end-to-end encryption and would diminish the security of everyone, regulators should incentivize measures that address CSA and protect communications security. Among these measures are facilitating user reporting of CSA material.

SIGN THE JOINT STATEMENT < HTTPS://DOCS.GOOGLE.COM/FORMS /D/E/1FAIPQLSCKW16LZJDT7966LKUW8P_6Q1JIYADE9CKX IVIIDKRVNDV1VIIG/VIEWEORM>

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue to use this site we will assume that you are okay with that.

AC-LAC (Alianza por el Cifrado en América Latina y el Caribe) Adam Shostack, Author, Threat Modeling: Designing for Security Africa Media and Information Technology Initiative (AfriMITI) Alec Muffett, Security Researcher Alexander Hanff, Privacy/Security Expert and Survivor of CSA ARTICLE 19 Associação Portuguesa para a Promoção da Segurança da Informação (AP2SI) Associação D₃ – Defesa dos Direitos Digitais Bits of Freedom Blacknight Calyx Institute Canadian Civil Liberties Association Carey Lening, Data Protection Officer and Privacy Advocate, Castlebridge Centre for Democracy & Technology CETYS - Centro de Tecnologia y Sociedad de Universidad San Andres Charly Greaux, GM, GLT2.0 Christopher Parsons, Senior Research Associate, Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy at the University of Toronto Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue to use this site we will assume that you are okay with that.

DFRI – Föreningen för digitala fri- och rättigheter **Digital Rights Ireland** Digitale Gesellschaft Dotzon GmbH Douwe Korff, Emeritus Professor of International Law, London Metropolitan University Electronic Frontier Finland (Effi) **Electronic Frontier Foundation** Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) Elektronisk Forpost Norge (EFN) Element Prof. Dr. Elena Andreeva, TU Wien **Encryption Europe** Encrypt Uganda Epicenter.works - for digital rights European Digital Rights (EDRi) **EySoft IT Solution** FlokiNET Ltd **Global Partners Digital** Hans Peter Dittler, ISOC.DE Prof. Dr. LL.M. Indra Spiecker **Internet Society** Internet Society Brazil Chapter Internet Society Catalan Chapter Internet Society Ecuador Chapter Internet Society Finland Chapter

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue to use this site we will assume that you are okay with that.

Internet Society Serbia, Belgrade Chapter Interpeer gUG IP.rec - Law and Technology Research Institute of Recife Iuridicum Remedium (IuRe) J. Alex Halderman Professor, Computer Science and Engineering, Director, Center for Computer Security and Society, University of Michigan JCA-NET Jon Callas, Director of Technology Projects, Electronic Frontier Foundation Dr. Joseph Kiniry, Principal Scientist, Galois Julf Helsingius Prof. Dr. Kai Rannenberg, Chair of Mobile Business & Multilateral Security, Goethe University, Frankfurt Prof Kapil Goyal, Alumni Fellow, Asia Pacific School of Internet Governance Kimmo Halunen, Professor, University of Oulu LAYLO L Jean Camp, Professor of Computer Science and Informatics, Indiana University Lorraine Kisselburgh, Purdue University Luka Modic, Bachelor of Criminal Justice and security, University of Maribor, Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security Mailfence.com Assist. Prof. Dr Marko Hölbl, University of Maribor, Faculty of **Electrical Engineering and Computer Science** We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue to use this site we will assume that you are okay with that.

Ot van Daale, University of Amsterdam Pablo Palazzi, Law Professor Panoptykon Foundation Privacy & Access Council of Canada Privacy International **Ranking Digital Rights** Riana Pfefferkorn, Research Scholar, Stanford Internet Observatory Rich Compton, Principal Engineer Dr. Roland Bless, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) SFLC.in Sharon Polsky MAPP, Privacy & Data Protection Specialist, Privacy & Access Council of Canada Sofía Celi, Cryptography Researcher Susan Landau, Bridge Professor of Cyber Security and Policy, **Tufts University** Sven Dietrich, Professor of Computer Science, City University of New York Dr. Sven Herpig, Director for International Cybersecurity Policy, Stiftung Neue Verantwortung Tarah Wheeler, Cyber Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Tech for Good Asia Dr. Thorsten Strufe, Professor, KIT/KASTEL Karlsruhe and Centre for Internet CeTI at TU Dresden Tresorit

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue to use this site we will assume that you are okay with that.

Vrijschrift.org X-Lab Youth Forum for Social Justice

*Affiliations listed for identification purposes only.

Joint statement on the dangers of the EU's proposed regulation for fighting child sexual abuse online 12 May 2022

The undersigned organizations, companies, and cybersecurity experts issued the following statement in response to the Regulation on Child Sexual Abuse (CSA) that the European Commission proposed on 11 May 2022:

Child sexual abuse is a serious crime that must be addressed by Member states and by other countries around the world. We are concerned, though, that the approach taken by the Commission in this proposed Regulation would have devastating impacts on the security of communications and on user privacy.

The Commission's legislation would enable Member States to compel online platforms, including those offering end-to-end encrypted messaging, to scan users' content and metadata for CSA images and for "grooming" conversations and behavior, and where appropriate, report them to public authorities and delete them from their platforms. Such a requirement is fundamentally incompatible with end-to-end encrypted messaging because platforms that offer such service cannot access communications content. This has been confirmed by experts around the world who produced an analysis of how any form of scanning breaks end-to-end encrypted systems in addition to a detailed report on the multiple ways in which client-side scanning, in particular, "can fail, can be evaded, and can be abused."

Instead of mandating measures that are inconsistent with end-to-end encryption and would diminish the security of everyone, regulators should incentivize measures that address CSA and protect communications security. Among these measures are facilitating user reporting of CSA material

Signatories¹

AC-LAC (Alianza por el Cifrado en América Latina y el Caribe) Adam Shostack, Author, Threat Modeling: Designing for Security Africa Media and Information Technology Initiative (AfriMITI) Alec Muffett, Security Researcher Alexander Hanff, Privacy/Security Expert and Survivor of CSA **ARTICLE 19** Associação Portuguesa para a Promoção da Segurança da Informação (AP2SI) Associação D3 - Defesa dos Direitos Digitais Bits of Freedom

¹ Affiliations of individuals are listed for identification purposes only.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue to use this site we will assume that you are okay with that.

To the top ↑

DOWNLOAD < HTTPS://WWW.GLOBALENCRYPTION.ORG/WP-CONTENT/UPLOADS/2022/05/2022-05-12-EU-CSAM-PROPOSAL-SIGN-ON-LETTER.PDF>

© 2022 Global Encryption Coalition < https://www.globalencryption.org/> Privacy Policy < https://www.globalencryption.org /privacy-policy/>

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue to use this site we will assume that you are okay with that.